
**Baghdad Pact**, popular name for the 1955 pro-Western defense alliance between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. At the height of the Cold War, the Middle East, with strategic bases bordering the Soviet Union, vital communications links, and significant oil wealth, represented a valuable region for Western interests. Initial attempts to align the emerging states in the area to Britain and the United States having failed (Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930), London and Washington initiated a sequence of well-known agreements, including the treaty of “friendship and cooperation for security” between Turkey and Pakistan (2 April 1954); the “military assistance” understanding between Iraq and the U.S. (21 April 1954); the Turkish-Iraqi “mutual cooperation pact” (24 February 1955); the special agreement between Iraq and Britain (5 April 1955) which amalgamated the political-military bloc of pro-Western regimes into the Baghdad Pact (Khadduri, pp. 309-24).

The Pact’s purpose was the “maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region” (Preamble) and called on member-states to “cooperate for their security and defense” (Article 1) and to “refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other’s internal affairs” (Article 3). “Open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in this region” (Article 5), the American-engineered alliance was intended to satisfy several objectives (Europa, p. 102). It appealed to its members for very different reasons although the rising influence of the Soviet Union and that of Arab nationalism, were widely shared. By agreeing to this treaty, Turkey improved its relations with Western powers and Iraq strengthened its position vis-à-vis Egypt (Gallman, pp. 21-65). Iraq, as the original opponent of Arab nationalism, goaded Cairo to stand in the way of the pro-Western alliance. Yet, London’s membership, intended to replace its 1930 preferential treaty which was about to expire, disappointed many Arab leaders, especially Gamal Abd-al-Nasser, who hoped for a neutral Arab bloc between the West and the USSR. Nasser opposed the Pact because he perceived it as a threat to his foreign policy objectives and as a tool geared to serve Western political and economic interests. Cairo also feared that such an alliance would isolate Egypt and strengthen the pro-British regime of Nūrī al-Saʿīd in Baghdad. Egyptian-instigated agitations against contemplated membership by Jordan and Lebanon were partially responsible for the disturbances in both countries in 1956 and 1957 leading the U.S. and Britain to intervene militarily. The Iraqi premier considered the Pact as a vindication of his source of power and to demonstrate his allegiance to the West broke diplomatic relations with Moscow in January, 1955. For Pakistan, the Pact was intended to balance relations with India and help it benefit from Western economic largesse. Iran, having abandoned its tradition of third-power policy and having disregarded Prime Minister Moṣaddeq’s experiment with a neutralist approach, wished to align itself with the West. Yet, despite the shah’s unquestionable sense of Soviet and Communist danger, he saw a unique opportunity in the alliance for the preservation of his throne (Ramazani, 1975, p. 276).

After the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1958, opposition to the alliance in the Northern Tier emerged among indigenous nationalist groups. The U.S., having joined the Pact as an Associate member in 1956, exercised great influence in the Economic and Counter-Subversion Committees but received a severe jolt when, in July, 1958, a bloody army revolt overthrew the pro-Western Hashemite monarchy of Faysal II, bringing into power the revolutionary Qasem regime. The Shah of Iran was shaken, fearing a similar fate for himself and viewing the upheaval in Baghdad as a “clear and imminent” source of threats to regional stability (Ramazani, 1975, p. 281). Iraq’s consequent withdrawal from the Pact, henceforth the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, q.v.), led to the transfer of the International Secretariat from Baghdad to Ankara, Turkey. In the wake of the Pact’s demise, the U.S. signed several defense treaties with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, guaranteeing their security against foreign aggression.


**Bagina, Baginapati**, reconstructed Old-Iranian words. The first designates a temple housing a cult image (from _bag-_, “god,” “image of a god” + suffix _-ina-_, “belonging to”); the second, the master of such a temple.

The form and meaning of both words are obvious from their descendants in various Middle-Iranian languages: Parthian (loanword in Armenian) _bagin_ “pagan sanctuary” (the early Arm. historians list seven _bagink_’
two of which stood in Bagaran and Bagawan; in a Christian context; also “altar set before a pagan image”). *bagānepat* “chief of the temple”; Pahlavi *bašned*, “idol-priest” (once in a Manichean polemical text); Bactrian *bāγnapat* (in Middle-Indian inscriptions from Mathura: *bakanapati-, vakanapati-,* designating an official in charge of an image-temple established by the Kushan emperors); Sogdian *vagn* (βγν-) “temple housing statues of gods,” in Christian context “altar”), *vagnpat* (βγνπ-) “priest” and in a Buddhist context “sorcerer” (hence βγνπρχ- “sorceress”).

In Sasanian Iran these words fell into disuse, no doubt as a result of the policy of the State church to impose fire-worship as the only lawful form of the Zoroastrian cult.

This development did not take place in Sogdiana, where at the time of the Arab conquest *vagnpat* and *margapat* “magus” are still attested as distinct offices, as shown by the archive documents found at Mt Mugh. This duality is confirmed by the accounts of the conquest, which mention side by side “idol-temples” and “fire-temples.” Judging from the place-names ending in -βγν or -baγn which can be gathered from the Medieval sources, image-sanctuaries had been widespread in Sogdiana as well as in neighboring Ustrushana, Fargāna, and Cāč, including in rural areas. The first element of the toponyms seldom provides a clue to the identification of the gods once worshipped in the temples (Smirnova’s attempts [1971] must be used with caution). It can be assumed that most of them belonged to the Iranian pantheon; but Shāivite intrusions or influences are also to be considered, and one place-name, *Sanjasβγn* (next to Samartgand), shows that the name *vagn* was eventually applied to Buddhist cult-places also (*sanjar < Sanskrit sanghārāma “Buddhist monastery”), despite the pejorative use of cognate words in Sogdian Buddhist literature.


(F. GRENET)

**BAGLĀN,** place name in northeastern Afghanistan.

i. **Kushan period.**

ii. **Modern province.**

iii. **Modern town.**

i. **Kushan Period.**

The name originally derives from the Bactrian *bago-lango* “image-temple” (< OIr. *baga-dinaka*), a term used in the inscription of Nokonzoko (SK4) from the archeological site of Surkh (Sork) Kotal in Afghanistan. In this text, the temple-complex excavated by the Délégation Archéologique Française en Afghanistan from 1951-63, is named as *Kanешko oamindo bagolango*, probably to be understood as “Kanishka-Victory-Temple.” Though since the word *oamindo* represents both the name of an astral deity of victory, depicted winged and thus named on the Kushan gold coinage, and as an adjective “victorious,” some scholars have taken it as an epithet referring to Kanishka.

The temple excavated at this site appeared to be a fire-temple of dynastic character, dedicated for the rulers of the Kushan dynasty. It was founded perhaps early in the reign of Kanishka (according to the unfinished inscription SK2 in the year 289 of an unstated era which is most probably a Greco-Bactrian era of about 155 B.C., thus fixing the date of construction to about A.D. 124), and restored in the year 31 of a different era, probably of Kanishka I’s own enthronement, perhaps thus equivalent to A.D. 125 + 31 = 156 or shortly after. The complex contained a *cella*, an attached subsidiary fire-temple piled with fine ashes, statues of at least two Kushan emperors, one of which seems identical with a coin-portrait of Huvishka, and a stone orthostat in poorly preserved state which appears to show an enthroned ruler in the presence of a trophy (for another theory see Fussman, p. 123).

The temple site is some 15 km northwest of Pol-e Komri in northern Afghanistan on the road to Balk, and about the same distance from the modern administrative center of Baglan, a struggling settlement on the opposite (east) bank of the Qonduz River beside the road from Pol-e Komri to Qonduz. The meaning and original location of the name were evidently forgotten during the Middle Ages, so that it attached vaguely to the district as a whole, and ultimately to its modern center. The region was no doubt closely connected with the Kushan dynasty, and it bore in the Islamic period the name Toqārestān which derives from that of the Tocharoi, the ancient horde of which they became the rulers.

See also BACTRIA; SOKH KOTAL.


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